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NORWAY'S CONTRIBUTION TO INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS
Change is the law of life. And those who look only to the past or present are certain to miss the future.
-President John F. Kennedy 1 During the Cold War Norway's main interest was to maintain territorial sovereignty on the northern flank of NATO. Use of military force to support Norwegian foreign policy on other continents was secondary, and most of the time conducted by reserve units, generated for one mission only. Today world wide operations is a primary mission for all units, and the armed forces has the last 10 years been transformed to enable world wide operations as part of multinational force structures. Norwegian defense and security policy have changed from a national, and mainly internal, approach to a global perspective. At the same time the political goals to contribute to international operations are higher than the will to maintain a balanced and sustainable force structure. What is Norwegian policy and are the political goals in accordance with the international system of the 21 st century?
Transformation of military force structures is a slow process, and today's situation with highly overstretched units, is probably both the result of an unfinished transformation, a mismatch between political ends and means, and a need to adjust some of the ways. My intent is to discuss the Army force generating process, and the ability to become more sustainable and maintain relevance for future operations. A more consistent cooperation with other countries and multinational force structures has to be assessed as a way to become more sustainable. Norwegian interests have always affected other nation states interests which also seem to be the situation in the 21 st century.
Multinational cooperation has therefore a double edge; it has to increase the efficiency to conduct ongoing operations and remain national ability and flexibility for the future situations. One of CoS Norwegian Army's main principles is to train as you fight 2 , and I believe there is a distinct potential to improve the national force generating process to become more effective and sustainable. A culture based on knowledge and effective teams must be the main goal, and the effect of each person will be more important than ever to achieve the common goals. The balance between current efficiency and future requirements will change, and must be measured with the need for a more consistent multinational cooperation. The quote from John F. Kennedy has proved its reliability, and the most difficult part will be to accept that our prediction of the future today needs adjustments tomorrow.
The International System in the 21 st Century
The end of the Cold War changed the international security environment dramatically, and President George Bush described in 1991 3 his vision for the future.
We have before us the opportunity to forge for ourselves and for future generations a new world order, a world where the rule of law, not the law of the jungle, governs the conduct of nations.
The international system consists of a number of actors and their connections, mutual reliance and interaction seems to be more complicated to understand than ever. During the Cold War the situation was more predictable with the two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the U.S., as dominant actors in a bipolar system, and for a small nation state the policy was determined of which side you belonged. The end of the Cold War left
Norway and the allied nation states without any visible enemy or direct threat against national territory, which combined with the ongoing globalization have led to more flexible and dynamic relations between the actors in the international system 4 Palin goes even further, and states that the UN is unfit to conduct operations that exceed peace-keeping missions 8 . At the same time, everyone seems to agree that there is a huge need of someone to legitimate necessary action, including use of force,
and the UN appears to be the only organization with world wide credibility and potential to do so.
NATO was born a few years later than the UN, also as a result of two world wars and the need to stabilize the European environment and deter Russia and the expansion of the eastern European communist block. The organization was built on the principle of collective security, vital for all nation states facing an increased tension to the Soviet Union's expansion. The end of both world wars, and a peace based on human rights and democratic development, was only possible with the involvement of the U.S. This involvement in European affairs remained vital during the Cold War, and as such NATO played a vital role. Today NATO has evolved into the new environment, and both Seyom Brown 9 and Raymond A Millen 10 rightfully question whether NATO is going to remain as a major actor in the international security system.
To catch up with the changing environment, NATO has launched several reforms.
The organization has been enlarged to a total of 26 countries, and includes most of the former European members of the Warsaw Pact 11 . For the new countries, the principle of collective security has been vital to start the long way to become sovereign and democratic states. NATO force structure is being transformed to meet new requirements, both with regard to command and control 12 and available and flexible force structures as NATO Response Force (NRF) 13 . At the same time, the ongoing operation in Afghanistan clearly demonstrates the challenges an organization based on consensus is up to in a dynamic environment with increased need for flexibility 14 . There is no doubt that the effect of NATO rely on the involvement of the U.S., and I do believe that both the U.S. and the European countries will have common interests to maintain the mutual reliance and a close cooperation in foreseeable future. NATO has the potential to maintain arena for this vital transatlantic cooperation, but the need for flexibility will evolve NATO into a fixed frame where timely coalitions may be formed to meet upcoming challenges.
The EU is the third pillar in the European security environment. The organization has evolved from an arena of economic cooperation to become a forceful player in the international system. European countries face common threats, and the EU has increased its focus on security matters, including a separate European security strategy 15 . The development has so far been in support of, and in close cooperation with, NATO, and further development seems to depend on NATO's ability to adapt to 
Norwegian Armed Forces
Having discussed the international system and Norwegian policy's relevance to it, it is time to verify the political requirements to the armed forces. In this chapter I will discuss the armed forces in detail, both to challenge my thesis and to recommend adjustments to enable a better coherence between political will and military capability. I assume that the easy way, increased financial budgets, is not an option and I will not include this alternative in my further discussions. and continuity at platoon and company level. After 12 months, each soldier either signs up for a short term contract and deploys to one of the ongoing missions, or sign up for a long term contract as full time soldier in one of the high readiness units. In addition, the NCOs are recruited out of the best conscripts, and the ambition is to achieve a turn over of minimum 7 years, with maximum service until the age of 35 years. As of today, there do not seem to be any major challenges to recruit required number of soldiers, but we do have a challenge to keep the personnel on short term contracts deployable after their first rotation.
After the Cold War, the Army reserve organization was dismantled in order to increase the quality. Today quantity has become vital to enable quality, and the need for an available reserve organization is more important than ever. I do not believe that a reestablishment of a separate reserve organization is appropriate. By the constitution it is voluntary to sign up for more than 12 months service and deployments to international operations. As in all organizations, the key is to establish a culture where each soldier has a strong sense of belonging and identity, and where it is a personal dedication and honor to serve as a member of a dedicated unit. These personal issues, identity and belonging, are most easily enhanced within the frame of a battalion organization. As a result, the time cycle of each battalion has to be extended beyond the 12 months cycle of today to enable administration of both conscripts and professional soldiers on short and long term contracts. This will give each battalion an optimized mixture of experience and enable regularly deployments without the need to deploy core personnel once a year as most of the units do today.
The number of deployable battalion units is vital to sustain long term engagements and required number of missions. As of today, the Army has a high readiness capacity 24/7, allocated in one unit with personnel on long term contracts 32 . This unit has capacity to deploy as a combined arms team world wide on short notice, and is probably among the best maneuver units in Europe to do so. For a small army, with a political ambition to contribute with substantial elements world wide in long lasting missions, it is a question of readiness versus quantity.
Development of NATO force structure affects Norwegian force structure directly, and the establishment of NATO Response Force (NRF) 33 has vital implications on our force generation process. NRF has a regular rhythm where each nation contributes in specific periods, leaving the forces available for other missions in between. At the same time, the capacity for national crises response has increased dramatically by adjusting the force generation process into two equal parts every six months. In my view, this is a risk assessment of army capabilities. The quality of units with a balanced mixture of personnel categories and experience are at an acceptable level to conduct all types of operations. In some cases they will need more time to prepare for all types of operations, but fully within NATO force requirements by prolonging the planning horizon of the force generation process. One way to increase the sustainability is therefore to make the whole force structure available to all missions, contribution to NRF included.
One consequence is that the strategic leadership has to conduct continuous risk assessments and prioritize between readiness and quantity.
The ability to conduct enduring operations of all intensities is at the brigade level.
At this level, all branch capacities merge into a system of systems and create the ability to conduct independent operations within a certain matter of time. In a joint and combined perspective, this is also the basic system which has the ability to effectively plan and use all available resources. Force generating of battalion systems has to be conducted in a brigade frame, both to create a realistic environment and to enable high intensity operations. Qualifications and credibility at this level will over time be vital, and it has to prove its qualifications to remain reliable. In a system where all elements are to deploy, it will therefore be necessary to deploy the Brigade HQ with supporting elements to maintain this capacity over a longer period of time. Norway will only be able to deploy an independent Brigade when interests of survival importance are at stake. In the security environment of today, deployment of Brigade HQ has to be part of a long term planning horizon and in a bilateral or multilateral cooperation, where Norway is in lead for a specific period of time. 43 . This is one of the core challenges with UN led operations, the ability to adapt to a dynamic situation, and maintain the ability to change modus operandi. In that case, I do support Roger H. Palin assessment that the UN is unfit to conduct operations that exceed peace-keeping intensity, both because of its lack of a relevant military command structure and because of the fundamental principle of neutrality 44 .
The EU security arrangements have a quite short history, and the first EU battle group is to be operational in 2008. Even though the organization is responsible for the ongoing operation in Bosnia, it is a basic principle that the EU is to be in support of NATO and to establish only crisis response capacity, able to conduct low intensity operations. At the same time, there is a clear tendency that European security issues are discussed both in EU and NATO, and for Norway, as a non EU member, this is a huge challenge. As of today, EU does not meet the requirements to frame future coalitions, but seems to remain a vital arena for political discussions. NATO is the only organization with a fixed military structure, and with implementation of the decided reforms the organization has potential to remain relevant in the international security system of the 21 st century. As discussed earlier, US will remain a dominant actor, and the organization will have to adapt to a more flexible and dynamic environment to survive. This new situation will force small nations to fulfill their commitments, and with decreasing budget, multilateral cooperation within a NATO frame seems to be a highly relevant way to go. material, and there is a great potential to achieve interoperability and interchangeability with regard to materiel and force elements. The main problem with non-NATO members, such as Sweden, is related to security issues, making it nearly impossible to achieve a common situational picture in high intensity operations.
We do have strong historical links to both UK and the U.S., but as major actors they have national interests in most of the future areas of operations. Roger H. Palin discuss this issue, and highly emphasize that Lead nations, in multinational forces,
should not have national interests in the area of operation 47 . If we go to multinational cooperation within the other services, the Air Force has had a close cooperation with Denmark, Netherland and Belgium since the decision to buy F-16 from the U.S. A similar Army cooperation will meet most of the requirements, and especially Norway and Netherland has as small states a lot in common both with regard to culture, doctrines and material. In the beginning of the 21 st century, a bilateral agreement between the two countries was discussed, but halted of several reasons. Due to my discussions of the requirements for effective coalitions in the 21 st century, there seems to be good reasons to renew those discussions in order to establish a more consistent cooperation.
Recommendations
At this point of my discussion, I will emphasize my thesis of a higher political will to contribute to international operations than the will to maintain a sustainable force structure. I have during my discussions verified the political will, and it seems to be growing, without any visible effect on the will to maintain a sustainable force structure.
There is a gap between the will to contribute and the will to adequately fund the force needed to support the political will, and I made early the assumption that increased budgets were not a relevant alternative in this study. There are two main areas where this gap may be reduced in order to increase sustainability and, for Norway, to remain a relevant and reliable actor in the international system of 21 st century. First, I recommend that the Army adjust the force generating process and national requirements that seem to be too resource-draining compared to effective output.
• The time to prepare a battalion unit has to be reduced from 12 months today to as close to 6 months as possible. To enable this, each unit need more full time soldiers, and the number of experienced NCOs has to increase. This is vital to decrease the time necessary for pure education, and make more time available for full spectrum unit training and preparation between rotations and deployments.
• The number of conscripts and full time soldiers are not large enough to maintain a sustainable force structure. The Reserve Organization has to be reestablished, and I recommend that this is done within the frame of existing 
Long term Conscripts Reserves
• The number of available battalions is crucial to achieve the political goals. It is possible to increase this number by adjusting the national requirements of having a continuously high readiness force available for NATO, and refocus this task in rhythm with NRF rotations. This will enable a more balanced level of experience in the whole force structure and facilitate the two previous recommendations. The consequence is an increased need of risk assessments at the strategic level with regard to quality and readiness and requires a high quality long term planning process. • It is vital to maintain ability to conduct full spectrum operations, and credibility at the Brigade level is essential to enable this. The Brigade level has to be a part of the deployment rotations, and as a small nation, this will only be possible in a multinational frame with bilateral or multilateral arrangements between relevant nation states.
I have focused on four main adjustments, and three of them are mutually reliant to each other. None of them rely on increased budgets, rather a balancing of available resources to a broader part of the structure to increase quantity and maintain vital capacity. The second part of my recommendations is related to the international cooperation, and the ability to remain a reliable actor in the international security environment of the 21 st century.
NATO is the only international organization which has any potential to accommodate the future security requirements. The U.S will remain the dominant actor in European security issues, and as of today, NATO is the only arena for transatlantic cooperation. It is important to recognize that the U.S is the only single actor in the alliance with all capabilities to conduct full spectrum operations, and I recommend a closer link to the U.S transformation in order to maintain national full spectrum competencies.
I have discussed NATO's challenges to become an effective military organization, and the enlargement to a 26 member alliance has not made the situation any better.
The differences between the member states have increased dramatically with regard to interoperable equipment, doctrines, and language skills, and it will take long time for the new members to become fully operational according to existing NATO standards. At the • NATO has an integrated command structure 49 , but each nation state limits the use of force to restricted areas, types of operation and chain of command as some examples. I fully understand the nation state's need to maintain national control, that is the nature of politics, but caveats which limits the multinational unit's ability to achieve agreed objectives are contra productive. Within an alliance, it should be possible to avoid this by a more consistent multilateral cooperation, enabling mutual understanding and trust between the nation states. This may be challenging to achieve immediately with all 26 countries, and it will be necessary to make it a long term NATO goal. On short term, culturally equal nation states, which meet the generic requirements 50 , should establish a consistent cooperation in fixed force structures.
• One of the most important success criteria is to establish a common situational • Logistic is according to NATO doctrine a national responsibility. Different equipment, national responsibility for own infrastructure, different leave periods and time of deployments, makes the number of boots on the ground relatively small according to the total number of soldiers in the area of operations.
Common regulations and multinational logistic elements are one of the most effective ways to increase the efficiency.
• NATO force generation process is conducted twice a year, and relies on the single member states will to contribute with required capacities. It is quite normal that the order of battle for each mission is decided just in time for the transfer of command. This leaves no time for common combined preparations, and limits the use of force more than necessary. Annually NATO conducts the Defense Planning Questionnaire process to set the short and long term force structure goals, and this process has to be coherent with the force generation process.
I have already discussed culturally equal nation states and their advantages in multinational force structures. In a consistent and long term cooperation at all levels, they have together the potential to deploy and sustain effective multinational combined arms teams at battalion and brigade level. Initially, a credible political and social network has to be established and agreed upon between the nation states. The agreement must include a common set of limitations and regulations, and has to be maintained by a working group of all nation states throughout the operation. NATO's own multinational Response Force has the same ambition, but in lack of consensus, the force structure has never been a deployed to ongoing operation.
Norway is already an integrated part of the German/Netherland Corps staff, and I recommend using this force structure as an umbrella for consistent cooperation at Use of non military elements of power is a highly effective way to reduce the gap between an unsupportable political will to contribute to the development of the international security environment, and the political will to maintain a sustainable military force structure. Other elements of power have to become an integrated part of Norway's contributions to international operations, and used in synergy with the military element.
Historically, the non-military elements of power have been used separately as national humanitarian aid to single nation states or linked to specific UN projects and initiatives. 
Conclusion
I started my discussion with a quote from President John F. Kennedy, and this is still wisdom to bear in mind for all strategic leaders. At the same time, we need to recognize that history tells us where, and why, we are, an important baseline to predict the future. To reduce the gap between the political will to contribute to the international security environment and the will to sustain a balanced force structure, I have recommended adjustments both with regard to internal army procedures and international relations.
The Army has to balance the use of conscripts in all units, and reserve personnel have to become a formalized part of the battalions' force structure. All tasks should be rotated between all units, and Brigade units and HQ has to deploy regularly. To maintain a balanced force structure and to sustain ongoing operations, Norway has to establish a more consistent cooperation with other small nation in fixed force structures within NATO. The goal is to deploy effective multinational CAT at Brigade and Battalion level, and I recommend using the GE/NE Corps as an umbrella for this fixed force structure. NATO need to establish a better coherence between the force goals and force generation processes, and Norway should enhance more synergy between the use of NATO's military force structure and EU's non military elements of power.
My recommendations will increase levels of contributions, enable competencies for full spectrum operations, and national and NATO sustainability, which in order will enhance Norway's credibility in the 21 st century's international system. The national control and flexibility of the military element of power will decrease, and we have to accept that the Army has reached a point where quantity is quality by itself.
For this paper I decided not to assume any increased budgets, which has been a Governmental tool to force the armed forces to transform into a new international reality.
This has been an effective policy, and continuously transformation will be necessary also in the future. So far, the defense policy has been a matter of finance and efficiency, and it is time to start talking about national effects and credibility in the international system. It is a word saying that you get what you pay for. Norwegians highly value freedom, liberty and the superior way of life, now it seems like we have to pay more to maintain these values in the future. 48 Figure 3 demonstrate the need to balance existing tasks between all available units. Another battalion, battalion 4, will also enable a better balance between tasks and available units, and establish a better ratio between deployments and time at home. This will probably create a need for more resources, and demonstrate in this paper only present unbalance between tasks and available units.
